Introduction
The issue of telling the patient the truth about his/her illness, or withholding it from him/her, being closely connected as it is, with social factors, philosophical ideas, cultural background and even political aspects, has been treated in many and various ways depending on time and place.
In most countries until the late 50s it was the 'primum non nocere' doctrine which prevailed, the first concern of doctors being to provide medical benefits rather than to respect the autonomy of the patient (1) . It was with the trials of malpractice in the United States and the great importance given to informed consent that this attitude started to change. Also the big societal changes that took place in most countries gave people a better understanding of themselves and their rights. Respect for the patient and his right to autonomy took precedence over the paternalistic view that 'the doctor knows best and he can act in the way he believes to be in the patient's best interest'. In Greece, the motherland of Hippocrates, hippocratic tradition prevails even today, and the basic maxim that the doctor's first responsibility must be to benefit and not to harm the patient governs medical practice and Key words Truth-telling. explains the often paternalistic treatment ofpatients by Greek doctors (2) . Although disclosure of the truth to the patient is a prerequisite for valid consent, lack of which might result in an offence to personal freedom and injury or offence to an individual (3), a few years ago in Greece it was very rare for the cancer patient, for example, to know what he was suffering from. The belief that the Greeks, as a Mediterranean people, are very sentimental, cannot accept a cruel truth and might react very badly was -and still is -shared by many doctors. The aim of the present study was to examine the views of the Greeks themselves on the issue of telling the patient the truth about his illness.
Subjects and methods
Five hundred questionnaires were gathered from apparently healthy people who had either: (a) visited a health centre at Areopolis (a small village in Southern Greece); (b) were members of a friendship club in Athens; (c) attended a seminar on health statistics in Athens (mostly health care professionals); (d) attended a course on epidemiology (third-year medical students at the University of Athens); (e) attended a course on public health (second-year students at the Technological Institute of Athens).
Information on basic demographic and socioeconomic variables was recorded, ie age, place of birth and residence, years of schooling, profession and marital status. The questionnaire included a question on whether the person's father and mother were alive; if they had died, we asked the cause of death. We also asked whether the respondent had suffered the loss of a beloved person recently (for example five years) and the cause of death. Afterwards, we asked whether the respondent considered him or herself a religious person and how often he/she went to church. Finally, we asked the main questions:
(i) Do Religion influenced the answer to this question to a statistically significant degree. People who were religious answered 'No' more frequently than nonreligious people, who answered 'It depends' more frequently.
People whose mother had died answered 'No' to a statistically significant degree; the loss of their father did not influence the answer to this question. Table 3 shows the distribution of subjects, by various socio-demographic factors, according to their reply to the question: 'Do you believe that when someone is seriously ill and has a relatively low probability (for example 10 per cent) of dying, the doctor should tell him the truth?'
Neither gender nor age seemed to influence to a statistically significant degree the reply to this question. Family status had a low statistical significance.
Education was very statistically significant; more people with lower education replied 'No'. Occupation did not seem to influence the reply to this question, however, doctors replied 'Yes' less frequently, compared to all others (except health professionals and students) to a highly statistically significant degree.
Place of birth did not influence the reply to this question, while the statistical significance of the place of residence was only indicative.
Religion and the loss of a beloved person were not statistically significant.
Linear discriminant analysis was applied in order to assess the independent association of each variable studied, as well as its contribution to the differentiation and classification of subjects into groups according to their reply to the first truth-telling question.
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) was used for this analysis. The (4) . ' It depends' is also the answer of younger or older people with higher education. Educated people are in a better position to understand the role of psychological and socioeconomic factors in the formation of an opinion regarding such matters: they believe that the disclosure of truth should depend on the psychological and mental status of the patient, his character and temperament, his ability to keep his self control, his age ('Yes' say younger people, 'No' say older people), the nature of the disease, and even on the doctor's certainty concerning diagnosis and prognosis.
The significance of the loss of a beloved person (especially a mother) is quite intriguing: it seems that the experience of watching a family member suffering in the knowledge of death and the feeling of being doomed, in other words deprived of the privilege of hope, makes a lot of people reject truth-telling. Perhaps the realisation of their own grief during the period of terminal illness of a beloved one and the inherent personal sacrifices, make the respondents feel that when a case is fatal, ignoring the truth may in the long run be the best and most humane approach.
The second question carries the notion of death, but in a more distant time. The person has a serious probability (for example 50 per cent) that he will die but not very soon (for example in five years). The answer 'Yes' is more frequent for all groups of people than it was in the first question, but the differences between the answers are not so evident. The participants gave as a reason for replying 'Yes' the impetus a patient needs in order to co-operate better with his doctors, to be more careful with his health, and to fight with more strength for his life.
In the third question where someone is seriously ill but has a relatively low probability (for example 10 per cent) of dying, the answer 'Yes' is also much more frequent in all groups of people, the differences between answers being even smaller. Only education and the doctoral profession have a high statistical significance. More people of lower educational levels insist on the answer 'No', and although more doctors say 'Yes', they are much behind all others.
The significance of religion, which is evident especially in the first two questions, can be explained as follows: religious people tend to reject truth-telling because their main concern is the well-being of the patient (the 'Christian spirit') and not respect for his autonomy. They prefer, thus, to follow the way which entails less psychological pain for the person concerned and greater peace of mind. It is questionable, however, whether ignorance of the truth and a hopeless struggle for life can contribute to such peace (5) .
The reasons the participants give for preferring truth-telling in this case are that knowing the truth can help the patient to be more careful and to follow his doctor's instructions; to organise his life in a better way and to defer, through changing his life-style, the time of death for as long as possible.
In general, the reasons given to justify truth-telling can be described as sentimental. It is remarkable that the word 'rights' is not invoked. As the field of medical ethics is still relatively limited in Greece, patient autonomy remains a vague or even unknown idea. The majority of patients are unaware of their rights and often let doctors decide on their behalf. Even younger and better educated people who tend to support truthtelling do not base their answers on notions such as autonomy, free choice or the right to decide what shall be done to one's own body, but rather on their feelings. Although it could be argued that such personal feelings, once analysed, are not very distant from the above-mentioned philosophical concepts, they are mostly based on practical attitudes to life. The survey thus confirms that Greek people lack not only the requisite theoretical background concerning their rights, but also the knowledge of the consequences of this lack for themselves in the health sector. This is quite relevant to the nature of a medical decision. Disclosing the truth means that the patient gets all the information she needs in order to decide about her body and her life. In other words, she is given the data which is necessary for the evaluation of the quality of her future life, the value of the medical intervention proposed and the calculation of the inherent risks. By refraining from telling the truth the doctor assumes the responsibility for these evaluations. He feels -or it has been imprinted in his mind -that he is solely responsible for making such decisions. This attitude, which is the prevailing one, has many elements of paternalism in it. From a different point of view it could also be argued that the doctor has the disadvantage of taking on his shoulders the whole burden of responsibility, whereas this responsibility should be shared. (6) .
This argument expresses the conflict between the doctor's duties of beneficence and non-maleficence: telling the truth is a necessary prerequisite for an informed and valid consent but, on the other hand, what if it can have deleterious effects? Also, from a legal point of view, the attitude of non-disclosure is 'encouraged' by the fact that -as the extent of medical litigation is still very limited in Mediterranean countries -Greek doctors do not feel obliged to disclose the truth in the same way American or British doctors would. Even when they do, it is questionable how much they tell patients. Moreover, they often take the view that patients do not really want to know and that often they waive the right to know.
The issue of truth-telling has been examined thoroughly by many authors (7-15) with many arguments for and against disclosure of the truth. One of the decisive factors involved in telling or not telling the truth is the patients' wish, since doctors must respect their patient's wishes. It seems that many surveys (16) (17) (18) (19) show that a high proportion of patients wish to know the truth. According to our study a smaller proportion wish to know the truth.
Among all those studied, 33. Should our conclusion be that most Greeks prefer not to know the truth about their illness? Should doctors continue to conceal the truth from them and not even ask for their consent to a serious treatment? In our opinion the answer should be 'No'. But in order to establish a similar mentality amongst the medical profession, education is necessary. Education not only of the doctors, but of the public as well. Doctors must learn that truth-telling is indeed an alternative to the practice that has been followed until today, an alternative with many difficulties but also with advantages. The main difficulty is the personal relationship between doctor and patient: telling the truth entails a humane approach to the patient on the part of the doctor, an approach which requires great professional and individual maturity. The advantages consist not only in respecting the patient's autonomy but also in the building of a relationship of trust and fidelity between the two parties. On the other hand the public must become aware of their rights and their responsibilities concerning their health. Education in medical ethics would guide the doctors as to how and when to reveal the truth and would help the patients to understand and accept it. 
